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The Particulate Constitution: Uncertainty and 
New Originalism 
“We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the 
effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is 
to follow.”1 
Once upon a time, it was believed that the universe was 
determinate—that the past determined the present, that the 
present determined the future, and that this clear line of cause and 
effect was neatly tied together by a “set of scientific laws that 
would allow us to predict everything that would happen in the 
universe.”2 To know the state of any system at any point in time—
past or future—all one needed to do was pinpoint the present 
position and velocity of the bodies in the system (like the Sun and 
planets) and then apply Newton’s laws of motion. It was simple, 
straightforward, predictable, and even easy (assuming a person 
knew the math required to apply Newton’s laws of motion). A 
determined past connected to an equally determined future 
through a discoverable present. 
This view changed in 1926, however, when Werner Heisenberg 
developed his Uncertainty Principle.3 Accepting that the relevant 
data points continued to be position and velocity, Heisenberg sought 
to isolate and observe single particles in the present to predict their 
future positions and velocities.4 He discovered through his 
experiments that it is impossible to know both the position and 
velocity of a single particle at the same time; the more one tries to 
accurately know the particle’s present position, the more that 
particle’s velocity will be disturbed, and vice-versa.5 Heisenberg 
thereby established that the futures of individual particles (and, by 
 
 1.  PIERRE SIMON, MARQUIS DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON 
PROBABILITIES 4 (Frederick Wilson Truscott & Frederick Lincoln Emory trans., 1902). 
 2.  STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 55 (10th ed. 1998). 
 3.  Id. at 56–63. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 57. 
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extension, systems and universes) can never exactly6 be determined 
because their presents are and will always be indeterminate. In doing 
so, he showed Laplace’s deterministic universe to be a Newtonian 
fairy tale;7 there is no point or place in time that can ever or will ever 
be certainly known. 
While interpreting a constitution does not require a thorough 
knowledge of Newtonian or quantum mechanics, it does require 
making a decision about how determinate that constitution should 
be. A constitution, like Heisenberg’s particles and Laplace’s systems, 
has both a fixed historical location based on its creation date and 
normative momentum that allows it to operate and work in the 
present and future. Theories of constitutional interpretation, when 
employed, create particular constitutional “universes,” and whether 
that universe more closely resembles the wholly determinate 
Laplacian universe or the inevitably uncertain Heisenbergian universe 
depends on the extent to which the meaning of the historical 
constitution directly propels the adjudication of contemporary cases. 
Though there are many constitutional interpretive theories, in 
this paper I will focus on discussing what kind of “universe” is 
 
 6.  Instead of knowing position and velocity as certainties (which would, of course, 
make the universe a much simpler place to exist), Hawking indicates that the Uncertainty 
Principle “implies that particles behave in some respects like waves: they do not have a definite 
position but are ‘smeared out’ with a certain probability distribution.” Id. at 58. When one is 
dealing with quantum mechanics, then, one is dealing in probability rather than certainty. 
 7.  Hawking makes an interesting observation toward the end of the book. In regards 
to quantum mechanics and the properties of waves, he states, 
[t]he unpredictable, random element comes in only when we try to 
interpret the wave in terms of the positions and velocities and particles. 
But maybe this is our mistake: maybe there are no particle positions 
and velocities, but only waves. It is just that we try to fit the waves to 
our preconceived ideas of positions and velocities. The resulting 
mismatch is the cause of the apparent unpredictability. 
Id. at 188–89. Perhaps we should stop trying to know position and velocity altogether and 
then uncertainty would disappear. This appears, in some ways, to be an argument that Living 
Constitutionalists (who accept New Originalism) make about how the Constitution should be 
characterized. Professor Jack Balkin argues, for example, that the Constitution is a framework, 
not a skyscraper, and that we should not be looking to the Constitution to try and find 
normative advice about how to decide particular cases (in other words, that the Constitution is 
more wave-like, with smeared probabilities regarding how future cases should be decided 
rather than particle-like, with position and velocity). See Jack M. Balkin, Framework 
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); see generally JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
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created by the interpretive theory known as New Originalism.8 It is a 
theory whose predecessor—what I will call Old Originalism—
developed in reaction to the rather expansive constitutional 
interpretations of the Warren and Burger courts, particularly the 
individual rights decisions of those courts.9 Old Originalism 
emphasized judicial restraint over judicial discretion, and tethered 
the task of constitutional interpretation to the discovery of the 
Framers’ original intent.10 While New Originalism claims to be a 
theory of originalism, in its most salient features—particularly its 
insistence that interpretation is a separate activity (in kind and in 
operation) from construction—it is an Originalist incarnation that 
bears little resemblance to the theory it claims to descend from. 
In Part I, I will briefly discuss the significant features of New 
Originalism as distinguished from Old Originalism. In Part II, I 
will specifically discuss the Interpretation-Construction distinction 
that is a key feature of New Originalism, comparing the 
“interpretation” piece to a particle’s position and the 
“construction” piece to a particle’s momentum. In Part III, I will 
argue that New Originalism’s Interpretation-Construction 
distinction injects Heisenbergian uncertainty11 into the 
constitutional “universe” by divorcing the Constitution’s operative 
past from its operative present (and future). Constitutional 
determinacy requires recognition, as it did in Laplace’s universe, 
that the Constitution is a single particle/body that has both a 
knowable, fixed position and discoverable, continuing momentum 
from that position. Unless its fixed position is tethered to its 
momentum—in other words, unless its historical meaning closely 
influences present-day applications—the Constitution cannot be 
used to tell us where we presently are or where we should be 
heading; we may, instead, be constitutionally lost. 
 
 8.  For a clear introduction to New Originalism, see Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004). 
 9.  Id. at 601. 
 10.  See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO L.J. 713 
(2011). Colby presents a detailed and thorough discussion regarding the points of difference 
between Old Originalism and New Originalism. 
 11.  While it may seem unconventional to compare quantum mechanics and 
constitutional interpretation, I feel like I am at least in good company by trying to: Laurence 
H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern 
Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
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I. OLD ORIGINALISM AND NEW ORIGINALISM 
Originalism, in all of its forms, is fundamentally a theory and 
method of constitutional interpretation. In 1988, Justice Scalia 
delivered an address titled “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,”12 where 
he clearly explained the differences between Nonoriginalism and 
Originalism. In it, he identified the “main danger in judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution” to be that “judges will mistake 
their own predilections for the law.”13 Such mistakes, he explained, 
are troubling because the “purpose of constitutional guarantees . . . 
is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in 
original values.”14 Nonoriginalism does not provide a solution to this 
problem because it permits a judge to apply his/her own perception 
of fundamental values to decide constitutional questions.15 Scalia 
explained that determining which values are actually fundamental to 
society and which are only fundamental to the individual decision-
maker is “very difficult,”16 and an interpretive approach that permits 
applying “current societal values” actually undermines the legitimacy 
with which the judiciary reviews constitutionality. Such a method 
creates a constitution more suited to be interpreted by legislatures 
that already deal in current societal values rather than the judiciary 
(whose province it is to interpret the Constitution).17 
Scalia argued that Originalism, by contrast, at least offers a 
“coherent approach” to the problem of interpretation18 and avoids 
aggravating that “main danger” of judicial review by establishing a 
“historical criterion . . . conceptually quite separate from the 
 
 12.  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 13.  Id. at 863. 
 14.  Id. at 862 (emphasis omitted). 
 15.  Id. at 863. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 854. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those 
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two 
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in 
opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, 
so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the 
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must 
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of 
judicial duty.”). 
 18.  Scalia, supra note 12, at 855. 
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preferences of the judge himself.”19 Instead of deciding questions 
based on one’s individual perceptions of fundamental values, a judge 
would immerse himself in the historical text, records, philosophies, 
attitudes, and beliefs pertinent to the time the text was originally 
written to discover the original meaning of that text.20 Scalia 
explained that by using Originalist methods the historical answer 
would be clear for most constitutional questions, and even if the 
modern values of judges were imposed upon the historical record, at 
least the results of interpretation would be more “moderate” and 
“more likely to produce results acceptable to all.”21 
Originalism is thus a theory and method of constitutional 
interpretation that is employed to interpret our federal Constitution 
according to “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the 
time of its initial adoption,” and considers that discovered meaning 
to be “authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in 
the present.”22 It presumes that the Constitution’s meaning was (and 
still is) “fixed at the time of” adoption/ratification,23 and that its 
fixed meaning is also discoverable using traditional tools of 
interpretation.24 In seeking resolution to constitutional questions, 
that fixed meaning creates a determinate Constitution with meaning 
that will not (in theory) change as modern values change. 
A. Features of New Originalism 
Initially, Originalism arose in the 1970s and 1980s when the 
Constitution that the Warren and Burger courts interpreted 
 
 19.  Id. at 864. 
 20.  Id. at 856–57. 
 21.  Id. at 863–64. 
 22.  Whittington, supra note 8, at 599. 
 23.  See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 65, 66 (2011); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 
1823, 1826 (1997). 
 24.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 861–62 (2009) (suggesting that the original 
meaning is found by considering “original public meaning of [the] words, phrases, and internal 
structural logic” of the Constitution); see generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 99–100 (2010) (discussing some various 
“facts” to draw from a piece of communication that impute linguistic meaning to a piece of 
text, such as the “marks” in the writing, “how [the] word [is] used,” and “the ‘rules’ (or 
regularities) of syntax and grammar”). 
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appeared to many to be anything but fixed or determinate. In 
particular, their individual rights cases conveniently “found” rights in 
the Constitution that many critics felt were neither obvious nor 
implicitly compelled from its plain language.25 As a result, 
Originalism was initially a “negative and react[ionary] theory” with 
an emphasis on judicial restraint that was accomplished by tethering 
the task of constitutional interpretation to discovering the intent26 of 
the Framers regarding the text at issue. The “value choices” of the 
Founders rather than the value choices of the sitting Justices were 
applied,27 and if, after assessing the relevant historical records, it 
appeared clear that the Framers did not intend a particular right to 
be included in a provision, that right was not protected by the 
Constitution. For Old Originalists, the Constitution’s legitimacy (as 
well as the judiciary’s legitimacy) depended upon its being, at least in 
some discoverable measure, determinate; the words chosen and 
included in the document needed to provide actual predictive 
direction for the resolution of present and future cases. 
However, Old Originalism faced legitimate criticisms. In 
particular, critics claimed that finding a single “intent” from a 
collectively created (and even more collectively ratified) document 
was an impossible and ultimately discretionary task. They argued that 
 
 25.  See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Bork, early in the piece, discusses the Griswold case as being “typical . . . of 
the Warren Court,” and states that the “choice of ‘fundamental values’ by the Court cannot be 
justified” and that instead “[t]he judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their 
fair implications, and not construct new rights.” Id. at 7–8. The Griswold case “found” a right 
to privacy in the Constitution that included the right to make decisions in marriage about 
contraception. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Another particularly policy-
driven opinion from the Warren Court was Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court, under the 
Fifth Amendment, held that statements made in response to police interrogation would be 
inadmissible in court unless a suspect in custody was informed of the right to remain silent and 
the right to counsel and thereafter voluntarily waived those rights. This opinion certainly 
imposed detailed procedural requirements upon law enforcement, but it imposed upon them 
the plain language of the 5th Amendment as well. 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
 26.  See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 708–13 (2011). Old Originalism, in its initial version, searched for 
evidence of Framer intent rather than evidence of the public’s original understanding. 
 27.  Bork, supra note 25, at 4. Bork states, “Value choices are to be attributed to the 
Founding Fathers, not to the Court.” Id. He states this as a justification for the legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court’s authority. He also states that “[i]f judges are to avoid imposing their own 
values upon the rest of us, however, they must be neutral” in the “application,” “the 
definition,” and “the derivation of principles.” Id. at 7. 
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searching for intent undermined whatever restraint Originalism 
claimed to create; a judge could still impose his/her own beliefs 
about values by choosing among the multiplicity of historical 
“intent” proofs to justify a particular decision.28 Critics also claimed 
that the Framers themselves did not intend the Constitution to be 
interpreted according to Framer intent.29 In response, and also in an 
attempt to gain academic legitimacy, Originalism has therefore been 
adapted and adjusted to address these criticisms.30 
Today, Old Originalism has become New Originalism, and New 
Originalism bears little resemblance to its predecessor. Both share a 
commitment to discovering the historical meaning of the 
Constitution, and both versions regard that meaning as a restraint 
upon judicial interpretive discretion. However, these Originalisms 
part ways in what kind of meaning is to be discovered, how 
determinate the language of the Constitution itself is considered to 
be, and what kind of part the discovered meaning has to play in 
application or adjudication.31 I briefly discuss each difference (fairly 
clinically) below. 
1. Original public meaning 
One of the key features of Originalism (both Old and New) is 
fixation—that the Constitution’s meaning was fixed at the time of its 
adoption, and discovering that fixed meaning is the ultimate object 
 
 28.  See Smith, supra note 26, at 712–13 (2011); Whittington, supra note 8, at 605–07. 
Also, Scalia noted that one of the issues with originalism is that “it may indeed be unrealistic to 
have substantial confidence that judges and lawyers will find the correct historical answer to 
such refined questions of original intent,” particularly because of the “enormous amounts of 
material,” some of it unreliable, that must be gone through, as well as the difficulty in 
“somehow placing out of mind knowledge, . . . beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices, and 
loyalties” of our day when parsing through the “enormous” evidence of original intent. Scalia, 
supra note 12, at 856–57, 863. New Originalism, as discussed, attempts to obviate the 
difficulty of determining one correct intent from an “enormous” amount of historical material 
by replacing original intent with original, objective meaning. See Smith, supra note 26, at 712–
13. Presumably, it would be much easier for an actor to read his own policy preferences into 
historical evidence that elucidates many individual intents than it would be to read policy 
preferences into a search for objective understanding. 
 29.  See Smith, supra note 26, at 712–13; Whittington, supra note 8, at 606. 
 30.  See Colby, supra note 10, at 744–64 (Part III, “The Cost of the 
New Originalism”). 
 31.  For a comprehensive, point-by-point discussion about the differences, see id. 
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of any constitutional interpretive inquiry.32 This insulates the 
Constitution from changing circumstances, values, exigencies, or 
events; that meaning is always original and always tied to the 
Founding Era.33 
However, while Old Originalism’s inquiry centered on 
discovering the Framers’ original intent as manifested through the 
text, New Originalists seek to discover the original public meaning 
of the text.34 This is an objective meaning because it is a search for 
“the meaning of the provision to the public on whose behalf it was 
ratified”35 (rather than the subjective meaning that many have 
argued is inherent in any search for intent36). In addition, for New 
Originalists, this meaning is not what the public actually would 
have understood the provision to mean; instead, it is an 
understanding centering on what a “hypothetical, reasonable 
person would have understood the words of the Constitution” at 
the time of fixation to mean.37 
 
 32.  Lawrence Solum has written specifically about what he calls the “fixation thesis” 
regarding why the semantic meaning of text is fixed at the time it is written. See Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459 (2013) 
[hereinafter Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction]; Lawrence B. Solum, 
Semantic Originalism, ILL. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPERS SERIES NO. 07-24 2–4 
(2008) [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. See also Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 634 (1999). Barnett argues that because the 
Constitution was written, “where it speaks it establishes a rule of law from that moment 
forward” and that “writtenness ceases to perform its function if meaning can be changed in the 
absence of an equally written modification or amendment.” Id. 
 33.  Or the date when specific amendments were adopted. 
 34.  This is the least controversial of New Originalism’s features. For an interesting (and 
pithy) discussion as to why original public meaning must be so, see Gary Lawson, Originalism 
Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2013). Lawson states, “if you want to know what 
an agency instrument (which the U.S. Constitution gives every indication of being) means, 
then you employ a methodology of original public meaning.” Id. at 1317 (emphasis omitted) 
(footnote omitted). He also, for anyone interested, somehow incorporates Humpty Dumpty 
into all of this. 
 35.  Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1991). 
 36.  See, e.g., Colby, supra note 10, at 721. Colby cites Scalia as arguing that “focus on 
original intent can be seen as inconsistent with the rule of law.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 37.  See Colby, supra note 10, at 724; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a 
Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006). In this article, Lawson and Seidman 
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2. Standards, principles, and generality 
The switch to original public meaning has influenced the level of 
specificity New Originalists discover in the constitutional text. There 
are many provisions in the Constitution that are very rule-like and 
appear to require little in the way of interpretation (regardless of 
theory). For example, the requirements that the President be thirty-
five years old38 and that each state shall send two senators to 
Congress39 seem to be very rule-like; the language itself does not 
appear to be flexible. A President, per the language, may not be 
merely thirty at the time of election, and a state may not send four 
senators instead of two. However, there are also provisions in the 
Constitution (particularly in the amendments) that do not appear so 
rule-like, such as the meaning of “due process” and “equal 
protection,” both of which could arguably encompass many specific 
but un-articulated rights. 
Old Originalists did not easily admit that the Constitution 
contained broad, open-ended, undefined provisions. If the judiciary 
was to be restrained by this interpretive theory, allowing the 
existence of vague or ambiguous passages without a determinate 
historical meaning would have defeated the theory’s admitted 
purpose;40 a judge could easily insert his/her own beliefs and values 
into vagueness or ambiguity to determine the case. To avoid this, 
Old Originalists presumed that the Constitution contained rules 
whose limits and boundaries could be determined by discovering 
specific Framer intent; if a provision did not initially seem rule-like, it 
would become so after the historical intent attached to that provision 
was discovered after research.41 The intent would then be applied to 
resolve the present case, which meant that by employing 
 
argue essentially that the “ultimate inquiry [regarding original public meaning] is legal,” even 
though it does appear to involve quite a historical undertaking as well. Id. The hypothetical 
reasonable person Lawson and Seidman describe is undoubtedly a figure that only lawyers 
would truly find comfort passing some time with. 
 38.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 39.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 40.  Colby, supra note 10, at 717; see also Bork, supra note 25, at 17–18. 
 41.  Colby, supra note 10, at 735. This is so because, as Colby states, “to the Old 
Originalists, originalism was more than simply an interpretive theory of meaning; it was an 
adjudicative theory as well.” Id. In other words, the interpretation drove the adjudication, and 
was not separated or divorced from it. 
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Originalism, the broader provisions of the Constitution (like “equal 
protection” and “due process”) effectively became as rule-like as the 
provision requiring that the President must be thirty-five. 
New Originalists, however, openly admit the existence of broad, 
indeterminate standards and principles in the Constitution.42 Because 
of the switch from subjective Framer intent to objective public 
meaning, interpreters accept that the reasonable hypothetical person 
at the time of the Founding might have understood a particular 
provision to embody a broad principle or standard, regardless of how 
narrowly or specifically the Framers may have expected or intended 
the provision to be applied.43 Indeed, many New Originalists have 
argued that proper interpretation requires this to be true—that in 
order to be faithful to the original public meaning, an interpreter 
must allow the Constitution to mean exactly what it would have 
been understood to mean—rule, standard, principle, and all.44 
By extension, some New Originalists45 also accept that the 
Constitution itself contains requisite levels of generality and 
abstraction within its language, and that the search for the original 
public meaning includes a search for the level of abstraction and 
generality. If the hypothetical reasonable person would have 
 
 42.  It is important to note that even though New Originalists accept the existence of 
standards and principles in the Constitution, they do vary in how many such provisions they 
allow to exist or how broadly they allow those standards and principles to stretch. This 
Paper is written theoretically, exploring the implications of the interpretation-distinction 
rather than passing opinion or discussing in-depth the various viewpoints regarding points 
within New Originalism. 
 43.  See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 375, 382–86 (2013). Whittington specifically states, “[E]xpectations about applications 
are merely predictions about the future consequences of adopting a given legal rule, and the 
author of the rule has no special privilege in predicting the future.” Id. at 384. See also Balkin, 
supra note 7, at 551–52; Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not 
as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 264 (2005) (stating that “an original 
meaning originalist can take the abstract meaning as given, and accept that the application of 
this vague meaning to particular cases is left to future actors, including judges, to decide”). 
 44.  See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 32, at 458 
(stating that “the actual text of the U.S. Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague 
provisions that require constitutional construction . . . for their application to concrete 
constitutional cases”). 
 45.  See Smith, supra note 26. Smith has referred to New Originalists who accept the 
levels of abstraction argument as New New Originalists. Again, within New Originalism there 
appears to be a spectrum (even if there is agreement on the basic theory and the components 
of the basic theory) regarding details within the New Originalist theoretical elements. Another 
paper for another day (or perhaps one could just read Smith’s article). 
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understood a very high level of generality to be contained in a 
provision such as “equal protection,” then that provision must fairly 
be interpreted as containing that high level of generality. Such 
interpretation is how an Originalist can be able to, for example, find 
that Brown v. Board of Education comports with the Constitution’s 
original public meaning when there is clear evidence that, at the time 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, equal protection was 
“understood not to invalidate racial segregation in public schools.”46 
The more general and abstract a provision is, the more potential 
rights and potential interpretations (or re-interpretations) that 
provision will encompass. 
3. Interpretation-construction distinction47 
Finally, one of the most defining adaptations of New Originalism 
is an insistence that there is a functional, separable distinction 
between constitutional interpretation and constitutional 
construction. Old Originalists did not distinguish between 
interpretation and construction. Once a judge had determined the 
meaning of a provision, that meaning drove the resolution of a 
particular case. In a sense, Old Originalist judges were purveyors and 
dealers of facts—the discovered intent was treated as a past fact48 that 
was unquestionably applied to resolve present facts. If the discovered 
intent would not have functioned to absolutely determine present 
adjudication, that fixed intent would have become a discretionary 
guideline rather than a rule, and in order to legitimize their claim to 
curbing judicial discretion, Old Originalists needed a Constitution of 
fixed, non-negotiable rules. Recognizing a space between 
interpretation and construction would have meant recognizing room 
 
 46.  See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162 
(2012) (stating that the usual Originalist justification for Brown is that it is correct when the 
“original understandings are characterized at the right level of generality”). It should be noted 
that Strauss is decidedly against this kind of generalization (as he argues in this article). See also 
Smith, supra note 26, at 720 (noting that even Bork, as an original Old Originalist, eventually 
came to justify Brown by determining that the meaning of the constitutional text includes its 
level of generality); Balkin, supra note 7, at 563, 571, 575 (suggesting that Brown makes sense 
based on changed social values in states and changes in national public opinion). 
 47.  This phrase has been borrowed from Lawrence Solum’s article, supra note 24. 
 48.  This was part of the chief criticism surrounding intent, though. Intent was not 
really a factual, objective inquiry. 
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for judges to impose their views and values onto the case at hand, 
and those discovered “facts” would have lost their rule-like character. 
By contrast, New Originalists regard interpretation and 
construction as distinct activities49 requiring different decisions and 
skills. Constitutional interpretation is the activity of discovering the 
original public meaning for a specific provision at issue.50 This will 
involve employing familiar tools of legal interpretation and assessing 
the historical evidence. Constitutional construction, on the other 
hand, is the activity of actually “applying that meaning to particular 
factual circumstances.”51 This involves translating the provision at 
issue into a norm capable of resolving the current case.52 Resolving a 
single case therefore requires (at least) two distinct steps: a judge 
must first determine the original public meaning of the provision, 
and only after that meaning has been discovered will the judge 
determine how to apply that meaning. In recognizing this 
distinction, New Originalists have been clear that Originalism is only 
a theory of interpretation, not a theory of construction (and thereby 
not a theory of adjudication).53 The implications of this distinction 
will be further discussed below, but this means that knowing what a 
provision means will not necessarily tell an interpreter how to apply 
or even whether to apply that provision to the case at hand. For those 
choices, something more than Originalism (or, in other words, 
something more than mere interpretation) will be required. 
II. THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION 
FURTHER EXPLAINED 
In this Part, I will discuss (again, fairly clinically) in more detail 
the difference between interpretation and construction as explained 
by New Originalists. Section A will discuss interpretation, and 
Section B will discuss construction. 
 
 49.  Barnett, supra note 23, at 66. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 70. 
 53.  Id. at 69 (stating that “originalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that 
identifies the meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment . . . . 
Originalism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out. This is not a bug; it 
is a feature”). 
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A. Interpretation 
Professor Gary Lawson has described the Constitution as “a 
recipe for a particular form of government” and has contended that 
interpreting it is no different “than interpreting a late-eighteenth-
century recipe for fried chicken.”54 Like a recipe, the Constitution is 
simply a set of instructions conveyed to the reader with varying 
degrees of linguistic clarity and precision.55 Determining the 
meaning of those instructions requires figuring out what the 
instructions would have meant to the public at the time the recipe 
was written.56 Interpretation does not include factoring in how fried 
chicken was prepared after the recipe was written; such an inquiry 
tells an interpreter little about what the words of this particular 
recipe meant because future readers’ actions or understandings are 
irrelevant as to a recipe’s original meaning.57 Likewise, interpretation 
does not include consideration of the present reader’s desire to make 
the best fried chicken possible because to do so would impose a 
presumption that the recipe should be used and applied before its 
instructions are even determined (in other words, it gets the inquiry 
backwards, when it is entirely possible the recipe produces terrible 
fried chicken).58 Interpretation is therefore an inquiry dealing solely 
and completely with the fixed, instructional past; the present plays 
no role in the ultimate determination of what those instructions 
mean. 
Ultimately, then, the task of interpretation is historically 
linguistic. For New Originalists, it involves discovering the semantic 
content59 of the language as understood by the public at the time of 
adoption. The semantic content is the linguistic meaning of the 
words, and the linguistic meaning “is determined by a set of facts.”60 
 
 54.  Lawson, supra note 23, at 1833–34. 
 55.  Id. at 1827. 
 56.  Id. at 1826 (“The presumptive meaning of a recipe is its original public meaning.”). 
 57.  Id. at 1828–29. 
 58.  Id. at 1828. (“One solution is to argue that the document should be construed to 
be the best document that it can be—the document that best achieves its evident purposes. On 
this understanding, whatever interpretation leads to the best fried chicken is correct. This, 
however, is a classic example of getting it backwards. Interpretation must precede evaluation, 
not vice versa.”) (citation omitted). 
 59.  Solum, supra note 24, at 98–100. 
 60.  Id. at 99. 
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This set of facts includes “the characteristics of the utterance itself,” 
such as “what marks appear in the writing,” “facts about linguistic 
practice,” how the words are used, and applicable “rules” of syntax 
and grammar.61 This may also include applying canons of 
interpretation62 that deal solely with how language works, such as the 
canon against superfluous text whereby each piece of the text is 
presumed to add meaning rather than repeating meaning already 
stated.63 However, interpretation involves no more than searching 
for and discovering the historical linguistic meaning.64 By extension, 
any activity beyond discovering this linguistic meaning is beyond the 
scope of Originalism. 
Practically, the instrumental effect of interpretation is determined 
both by whether the provision at issue would have been understood 
to be a rule, a standard, or a principle, and also by the linguistic 
precision of the words themselves. As discussed in Part I, New 
Originalists understand the Constitution to contain rules, standards, 
and principles. If the provision at issue would have been understood 
by the original public to embody a principle or standard, it is much 
more likely the interpretation of that provision will simply “run 
out”65 before resolving the present case. Principles and standards are 
inherently able to encompass and resolve a wider range of situations 
than rules; they are also concomitantly able to encompass a wider 
range of value and policy choices that can comport with the original 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  These are distinct from canons of construction that actually instruct and direct as to 
the text’s substance rather than simply its linguistic and/or grammatical interpretation. See id. 
at 113. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Colby, supra note 10, at 734 (“When originalist interpretation produces a 
meaning that is not specific enough to resolve the issue at hand, we must go beyond 
originalism in order to decide the case. There can be no originalist answer to the question of 
which construction to apply; by definition, construction supplements interpretation and 
cannot be dictated by it.”); Whittington, supra note 8, at 611 (“However, originalism is 
incomplete as a theory of how the Constitution is elaborated and applied over time. Although 
originalism may indicate how the constitutional text should be interpreted, it does not exhaust 
what we might want to do and have done with that text.”); Solum, supra note 24, at 104 
(“Because interpretation aims at the recovery of linguistic meaning, it is guided by linguistic 
facts—facts about patterns of usage. Thus, we might say that interpretation is ‘value neutral,’ 
or only ‘thinly normative.’ The correctness of an interpretation does not depend on our 
normative theories about what the law should be.”). 
 65.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 32, at 19; Colby, supra note 10, at 733. 
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public meaning. In such cases, the semantic meaning will be unable 
to resolve case-by-case applications because that meaning will not 
clearly or precisely instruct an adjudicator how to narrow that range 
of value and policy choices to resolve a specific question or issue. 
Something else—construction—will have to supplement the 
semantic meaning in order to give effect to that meaning and allow 
the standard or principle to do work in the present.66 
In contrast, if the provision at issue would have been understood 
to embody a clear rule, it is likely that the interpretation will both 
inform the interpreter as to the provision’s meaning and also allow 
the interpreter to apply that meaning without any supplement. This 
will be the case because rules, unlike principles and standards, allow 
for only narrow policy and value choices, and whether the facts of a 
particular case comport with the rule will be much more obvious. In 
such a case, the interpretation does not run out, and the two 
activities—interpretation and construction—effectively collapse into 
each other.67 
Additionally, linguistic precision (or lack thereof) will determine 
how instructive interpretation will be when the meaning is applied. 
New Originalists readily recognize that the language of the 
Constitution is often either ambiguous or vague. “Ambiguity refers 
to words that have more than one sense or meaning.”68 Generally 
speaking, ambiguity can be resolved by resorting to the context in 
which a statement is made. Because interpretation will routinely 
involve viewing statements in the context in which they appear, a 
theory of interpretation will often resolve any ambiguity to indicate 
which meaning is correct. Also, because the inquiry is historical, 
there will usually be historical evidence available to indicate which 
meaning is likely to be correct.69 However, in the cases where the 
ambiguity is irreducible70—where the context actually does not 
 
 66.  Whittington, supra note 8, at 611–12. 
 67.  It is important to remember that even if the interpretation and construction appear 
to collapse or merge into each other, they are still distinct activities. The difference with clear, 
precise rules is that their original public meaning simply will not require a judge to devise any 
doctrine or rule of construction beyond the words themselves to apply them. Application is 
still separate from interpretation, though. 
 68.  Barnett, supra note 23, at 67 (emphasis removed). 
 69.  Id. at 68. 
 70.  Solum, supra note 24, at 102. 
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reduce the question of meaning to indicate which meaning is 
correct—the interpretive theory alone will not be able to solve the 
issue and construction will be required. 
Vagueness, by contrast, “refers to the penumbra or borderline of 
a word’s meaning, where it may be unclear whether a certain object 
is included within it or not.”71 While there may be historical evidence 
and contextual clues to allow the interpretation of the words 
themselves, with vagueness, the words (and all the evidence 
explicating the words) often do not provide enough information to 
indicate how those words are to be applied, especially where it is not 
clear whether something does or does not fall within the boundaries 
of the words.72 In such cases, construction will be necessary, as in 
cases of irreducible ambiguity, to supplement the meaning of the 
words even if the words themselves are accurately interpreted.73 
B. Construction 
While interpretation is thus a fairly factual inquiry, construction 
requires making normative decisions about how to apply the 
discovered semantic meaning in the present to a set of actual facts 
or circumstances.74 New Originalists accept that these normative 
decisions are many and varied. One type of normative decision 
involves creating doctrines that the judiciary believes to best 
effectuate a certain provision. For example, the “time, place, and 
manner” restriction in First Amendment jurisprudence is a 
judicially-created doctrine75 designed to balance the government’s 
interest in maintaining order with a citizen’s interest in free 
expression. The language of the First Amendment itself would not 
have linguistically been understood to require time, place, and 
 
 71.  Barnett, supra note 23, at 67 (emphasis removed). 
 72.  Id. at 68. 
 73.  See Solum, supra note 24, at 102. 
 74.  Id. at 104 (“But construction is not like interpretation in this regard—the 
production of legal rules cannot be “value neutral” because we cannot tell whether a 
construction is correct or incorrect without resort to legal norms. And legal norms, 
themselves, can only be justified by some kind of normative argument. For this reason, theories 
of construction are ultimately normative theories: because constructions go beyond linguistic 
meaning, the justification for a construction must include premises that go beyond 
linguistic facts.”). 
 75.  Barnett, supra note 23, at 69. 
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manner restrictions at the time it was adopted, nor would it have 
obviously required the reviewing court to balance government 
interests against private interests; there is simply no way that the 
original public would have linguistically understood the words 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” 
to somehow incorporate time, place, and manner or balancing 
considerations.76 However, in determining how best to apply that 
portion of the First Amendment to present circumstances and fairly 
represent both interests—government and private—regarding 
expression, the Court constructed the “time, place, and manner” 
doctrine. The doctrine extended beyond the factual interpretive 
meaning to normatively incorporate present value and policy 
choices into the text of the First Amendment. 
Another type of normative decision in construction is deciding 
which institutional body—the political branches or the judiciary—
should make decisions regarding construction in the first place. New 
Originalists are not all in agreement on this point. Some have argued 
that in cases where interpretation does run out, the judiciary should 
defer to the political branches because that best effectuates 
democratic policy and choice.77 On the other end of the spectrum, 
others78 argue that the judiciary and the political branches may both 
engage in construction because they are all institutionally capable 
and mutually supportive of each other in the task of creating 
doctrines to solve present-day cases and exigencies.79 
 
 76.  In fact, an argument could be made, based on the language itself, that the public 
would have understood those words to mean that time, place, and manner restrictions 
expressly abridged their right of expression. 
 77.  James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
433, 440 (2013) (identifying three available “models” of construction: construction as politics, 
construction as principle, and construction by original methods). See also Paulsen, supra note 
24, at 881 (“A somewhat improved answer might be that the Constitution’s text itself 
suggests, as a practical matter, a default rule of interpretation where the constitutional text is 
unspecific: popular republican self-government. . . . The more unspecific a text, the more room 
it leaves for democratic choice, in accordance with the structures of government the 
Constitution creates at the federal level and mostly leaves alone at the state level.”). 
 78.  Such as Professor Jack Balkin. 
 79.  Balkin, supra note 7, at 562 (“This is the central insight of living constitutionalism: 
state-building by the political branches and judicial constructions are, generally speaking, 
mutually productive and mutually supportive. To use the metaphor of the living constitution, 
they grow up together.”). 
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Yet another normative consideration is choosing which 
substantive canons of construction to apply to a particular provision 
at issue.80 While textual canons deal solely with the linguistic 
meaning of the text, substantive canons go toward how the provision 
will legally apply to particular facts.81 For example, the “rule of 
lenity” is a canon that says a criminal statute’s ambiguity is to be 
resolved in favor of the criminal defendant. This canon does not go 
toward determining the linguistic meaning of the statute at issue—
presumably, the entire reason for lenity to be applied in the first place 
is because the linguistic meaning of the text does not clearly resolve 
the case at issue—and after the canon is applied, its linguistic 
meaning will likely still be ambiguous. Instead, this canon reflects a 
substantive value choice in favor of criminal defendants. It is a value 
choice that instructs judges how to apply the laws at issue in a 
particular case, not how to determine the linguistic meaning of 
such laws. 
In any event, whatever the normative considerations in play, the 
application of such considerations to the facts of a particular case is 
what ultimately gives the historical semantic meaning its present legal 
content. According to New Originalists, without construction, 
semantic meaning cannot often translate into law; without 
construction, the linguistic meaning will be known in the present 
without actually doing work in the present.82 
III. UNCERTAINTY INJECTION: THE PARTICULATE CONSTITUTION 
The Old Originalist’s constitutional universe was much like the 
Marquis de Laplace universe—determinate and discoverable and 
predictable and cohesive. The Constitution in the present meant 
what the Framers intended it to mean in the past, Framer intent 
would continue to resolve constitutional questions in the future, and 
that intent was predictably discoverable through traditional tools of 
interpretation. Further, Old Originalism’s entire purpose was to 
 
 80.  Solum, supra note 24, at 113. 
  81.  Id. 
 82.  As discussed before, while there are provisions in the Constitution where the 
semantic meaning and the legal content appear to be synonymous (such as the age-of-the-
President provision), for many provisions, this will not be the case. Even so, New Originalists 
still regard the two activities as separate and still in play in their respective roles behind 
the scenes. 
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eliminate space that would have allowed judges to impose their own 
beliefs onto the Constitution. Because of this, interpretation and 
construction were not recognized as separate activities; the 
Constitution meant what it meant, and that meaning, in every case, 
determined the outcome. Old Originalism was thus a theory of 
adjudication, not a theory of law.83 
The New Originalist’s constitutional universe, instead, is often 
rather uncertain. As discussed in Part II, interpretation and 
construction are separate activities. Interpretation involves looking 
backward to 1787 (or to the subsequent dates when amendments 
were adopted), while construction involves pulling that meaning 
forward to resolve issues in the present. In some cases, it is not 
always necessary for a court to obviously construct a legal doctrine to 
effectuate particular provisions; there are some provisions in the 
Constitution where the semantic meaning clearly resolves a question 
at issue.84 In contrast, while New Originalists do claim to be bound 
by the original public meaning in construction, it is not clear 
whether that meaning has anything but a vanishing-point bearing on 
the resolution of a case where the constitutional text at issue is 
general, abstract, vague, or communicates a broad principle.85 
Additionally, the activity of interpretation is not actually necessary to 
the activity of construction. It is possible to know the original public 
meaning—the semantic meaning of the words to the public when 
 
 83.  Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from 
Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 546 (2013) (“In a nutshell, old 
originalism was (chiefly) a theory of adjudication, whereas new originalism is (chiefly) a theory 
of law.”); see also Lawson, supra note 23, at 1823 (“Theories of interpretation concern the 
meaning of the Constitution. . . . Theories of adjudication concern the manner in which 
decisionmakers (paradigmatically public officials, such as judges) resolve disputes.”). 
 84.  Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 32, at 468 (“In 
some cases, giving the text legal effect might be unmediated; we read the text and put it into 
effect. But in other cases, the legal effect of the text is mediated by doctrines of 
constitutional law.”). 
 85.  Id. at 457–58. In fact, Solum’s argument in this article is that the “construction 
zone,” as he refers to it, “is ubiquitous in constitutional practice” and that this “construction 
zone is ineliminable: the actual text of the U.S. Constitution contains general, abstract, and 
vague provisions that require constitutional construction . . . for their application to concrete 
constitutional cases.” Id. 
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the text was adopted—without that meaning dictating or 
determining the construction of legal doctrine.86 
The recognition of the interpretation-construction distinction 
therefore injects Heisenbergian Uncertainty into the Constitution. It 
imposes onto the Constitution two distinct, separable characteristics, 
much like Heisenberg’s particles: the Constitution has both location 
(through interpretation back to that fixed original meaning), as well 
as velocity (through construction to assemble present legal 
meaning). In this Part, I will briefly discuss the Uncertainty 
Principle, and then discuss how the interpretation-construction 
distinction in New Originalism imposes particle-like characteristics 
on the Constitution. I will conclude this Section by discussing 
implications of having a particle-like Constitution. 
A. The Uncertainty Principle 
In a Heisenberg universe, particles are the featured players. 
Particles make up everything;87 they are fundamental building 
blocks, and their properties (and interactions) ultimately determine 
how the universe operates and expresses itself. In 1926, Heisenberg 
wanted to be able to use these particles to predict the future of the 
universe by measuring both the present location and the present 
velocity of the particles. If those two properties could be known, 
then presumably the entire universe was ultimately predictable.88 
However, he encountered a problem. The best way to “see” a 
particle is to shine light on it. In this scenario, the particle will 
theoretically cause the light waves to scatter, and this scattering will 
indicate the location of the particle.89 Prior to Heisenberg’s 
experiments, in 1900, Max Planck suggested that light waves 
emitted in specific “packets” he called “quanta,” and that “each 
quantum had a certain amount of energy.”90 The energy of a 
 
 86.  See Balkin, supra note 7, at 552 (“But fidelity to original meaning does not require 
fidelity to original expected application. Original expected application is merely evidence of 
how to apply text and principle. Each generation is charged with the obligation to flesh out 
and implement text and principle in their own time.”). 
 87.  HAWKING, supra note 2, at 68. 
 88.  Id. at 56–58. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
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quantum increased as the wave frequency91 increased (in other 
words, the shorter the wavelength, the more energy the wave 
carried). Because the particles Heisenberg desired to “see” were very 
small, in order to “see” a single particle, the wavelength needed to 
be very short. Unfortunately, he found that directing a quantum of 
light toward a particle unpredictably interacted with the particle to 
change its velocity, and the more precisely he tried to measure the 
location (by directing quanta of increasingly higher energy toward 
the particle), the more the velocity of the particle was displaced.92 
Heisenberg had discovered the problem of quantum 
mechanics—that every particle has a quantum state which is a 
combination of position and velocity,93 and that one cannot precisely 
know both at the same time. The more one tries to locate the 
particle, the more energy must be used to “see” the particle, and the 
more that particle’s velocity will be disturbed. On the other hand, 
the more one tries to measure a particle’s velocity, the less precisely 
one will be able to know the particle’s position (a person will know 
how quickly it is moving, but just not from where). Importantly, 
Heisenberg showed that it does not matter the method by which a 
person attempts to measure the position or velocity, or even what 
kind of particle one attempts to measure; the uncertainty he 
discovered, like those particles themselves, is a fundamental part of 
our universe. In such a universe, the best we are able to do is predict 
“a number of different possible outcomes” and indicate how 
probable each outcome is;94 we live in a universe of probabilities 
rather than certainties. Instead of a clear, precise, predictable 
universe, we are left with one that is, at best, blurry.95 
 
 91.  Hawking defines this as “the number of complete cycles per second.” Id. at 201. A 
wave cycle is the wavelength, or the “length of one complete wave cycle.” See also The 
Anatomy of a Wave, THE PHYSICS CLASSROOM, http://www.physicsclassroom.com/class/ 
waves/Lesson-2/The-Anatomy-of-a-Wave (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
 92.  Particle velocity is directly related to the energy of the wavelength directed at it 
(and that is moving through/around it); the velocity of the particle is thus the displacement 
speed caused by the particle’s interaction with the wave itself. See HAWKING, supra note 2, 
at 56–57. 
 93.  Id. at 57. 
 94.  Id. at 58. 
 95.  Id. Hawking’s precise terminology is “smeared out.” 
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B. The Constitution as a Particle 
If we accept that everything else in the physical universe is 
fundamentally composed of particles, there is no reason to think the 
Constitution, as a fundamental building block of our national 
universe, is any different.96 New Originalism’s interpretation-
construction distinction creates such a particulate Constitution. 
Rather than conceptualizing constitutional case resolution as a 
cohesive inquiry where position and velocity (or interpretation and 
construction) are one-in-the-same,97 it fragments the resolution into 
two distinct inquiries—a factual, position-like inquiry and a 
normative, velocity-like inquiry. In this Section, I will discuss the 
position-like characteristics of interpretation, and the velocity-like 
characteristics of construction. 
1. Position-like interpretation 
Interpretation is solely concerned with discovering an original 
textual position. The text is frozen at a fixed point in time, much 
like a particle’s position (if it could be discovered) is fixed. That 
point in time is whenever the particular provision was first. As 
discussed, for most of the Constitution, that specific point will be 
when the Constitution was adopted as the founding document of 
our government, and that point in time corresponds to the only 
linguistic meaning that matters. This means that all of the evidence 
the interpreter will need to examine to determine that linguistic 
meaning must also be from that same fixed point, to the exclusion 
of future evidence.98 
 
 96.  There’s no reason to think that it isn’t, you know. It was written by people 
composed of particles, on paper composed of particles, with ink composed of particles. And if 
everything else in the entire universe—from asteroids to neutron stars to the rock-formerly-
known-as-planet-Pluto—is composed of particles, I’m not sure why we should think that the 
Constitution is an exception to the rule. In fact, our national universe could be said to be 
populated with many kinds of particles. There are congresses, judiciaries, executives, and 
agencies. There are state constitutions, statutes, precedential cases, and executive orders. There 
are treaties and diplomatic agreements. And there are the actors themselves—people who use 
these different kinds of particles to continually shape our national universe. In such a model, 
the Constitution would also be a particle that, like all the others, has distinct position 
and velocity. 
 97.  Such as, “What does the Constitution say about how to resolve this particular 
case?” Realize, this is essentially what Old Originalism asked. 
 98.  See supra Part II. 
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Additionally, like a particle’s position will be factually objective, 
the meaning of fixed constitutional provisions is also considered to 
be factually objective. Rather than ascertaining what specific persons 
(such as the Framers) or a specific segment of the public might have 
understood the words to mean at that fixed point in time, New 
Originalists ask what a hypothetical person at the time would have 
understood the words to mean;99 however the Framers (individually 
or collectively) may have expected, desired, or intended a particular 
provision to be applied simply does not matter.100 As part of this 
inquiry, New Originalists specifically seek to discover and apply the 
objective characteristics of that hypothetical, historical, reasonable 
individual101 to determine how those characteristics bear on the 
factual linguistics of the words. For example, Professors Gary 
Lawson and Guy Seidman have theorized that the hypothetical 
person possesses characteristics such as “high degree of intelligence 
and education,” “strong commitment to human reason,” and 
“learned in the law.”102 They ultimately conclude that this 
hypothetical person is like the familiar “reasonable person” that we 
already frequently use in other legal contexts, and that this legal 
“hypothetical mind”103 is the public mind we should be employing to 
understand and interpret constitutional provisions. 
New Originalist interpretation, like a particle position, 
therefore involves discovering a “where” that is both singular and 
wholly independent from both the judge’s own views about 
history as well as the individualistic views of those who wrote, 
recorded, or experienced that history. In theory, the range of 
judicial choice will be narrowly and highly focused on discovering 
one objective, locative meaning; the only “where” that New 
Originalists care about discovering vis-à-vis public meaning is that 
original, objective “where.”104 
 
 99.  Lawson & Seidman, supra note 37. 
 100.  Whittington, supra note 43. 
 101.  Lawson & Seidman, supra note 37, at 70–73. 
 102.  Id. at 72. 
 103.  Id. at 73. 
 104.  See supra Part II. 
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2. Velocity-like construction 
Knowing the fixed “where,” however, is not sufficient for the 
New Originalist.105 Interpretation does not incorporate the facts or 
circumstances of present questions, and so New Originalists employ 
construction in recognition of the fact that the Constitution will 
always be applied and adjudicated in the present (surrounded by 
pertinent, present, policy concerns) rather than at that fixed past. 
This normative desire for inclusion of present circumstances 
presupposes that the Constitution itself is capable of a kind of 
velocity. Recall that particle velocity is not the velocity of the 
particle before the interaction with light wave; it is the displacement 
speed caused by the interaction with the wave (and the quanta 
energy contained in the wave) itself. For the Constitution to have 
displacement velocity, there must be waves interacting with it to 
unpredictably change its speed. New Originalist waves include 
“quanta” of present-day values, circumstances, and exigencies 
(particularly those intertwined into a specific case) that are pressed 
onto the constitutional text.106 These “quanta” of present-day 
values, circumstances, and exigencies are directed at the 
constitutional particle and necessarily interact with the 
constitutional text during adjudication. The displacement 
velocity—the change in speed—is represented by the construction 
that finally incorporates present-day circumstances and 
considerations into those historical, fixed provisions. 
As opposed to the factually-driven semantic meaning, velocity 
thus involves normative, what-this-provision-should-mean-today 
inclusion into the text based on the “quanta” of value and policy 
considerations in play as well as the normative considerations in 
construction discussed in Section II.B. Also, as cultural norms and 
technology change, those changes are also incorporated as additional 
“quanta” that may be passed through the constitutional text to 
seemingly and necessarily create or discover rights (or new aspects of 
rights) based on the anticipated implications of those changed norms 
or new technologies.107 Given all of this, constructive, “quanta”-
 
 105.  It would have been for the Old Originalist. 
 106.  For the most controversial discussion of these “waves,” see Balkin, supra note 7. 
 107.  For example, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the rise of automobiles created 
new concerns about increased mobility of criminals and potential criminal evidence; in 
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incorporated decision(s) a judge makes when adjudicating a present 
case will ultimately displace the meaning of the constitutional 
provision at issue. 
3. Comparing position and velocity 
Because these waves and “quanta” therefore involve 
considerations about how the present should explicate semantic 
meaning rather than what that semantic meaning is, velocity is 
functionally and qualitatively different than the factually-determinate 
position. This difference means that velocity and position can be 
(and are) measured with little to no reference to the other. In order 
to determine position through interpretation, a New Originalist will 
never incorporate present values or circumstances and impose them 
on the original semantic meaning. Interpretation is an end in itself; 
whatever one chooses to do with the semantic meaning is beyond 
the task of interpretation and becomes construction.108 
Similarly, while constructions may be said to be constrained by 
the semantic meaning, when that semantic meaning embodies a 
broad principle (as is often the case in many of our most 
controversial cases), as long as the constructed meaning comports 
with the semantic meaning (remember, this is nothing more than the 
historically factual, grammatical, linguistic meaning), there is no New 
Originalist issue with the construction. In those cases, the semantic 
meaning operates as little more than a silent figurehead, and the 
construction easily carries and incorporates present-day 
considerations. Further, normative considerations are created in the 
present rather than discovered through historical fact. While history 
may have some bearing, it is not a necessary incident to a normative 
consideration’s creation or use; it is completely possible to comport 
with historical linguistic meaning (especially if this meaning is a 
principle or standard) without having considered or incorporated any 
of the substantive history behind that linguistic meaning.109 
 
response, in 1925 the Supreme Court ruled in Carroll v. United States that a car could be 
searched without a warrant because of how quickly cars could change location, incorporating 
the effects of technology into traditional search and seizure law. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 108.  In fact, one could choose to not apply it at all. Lawson, supra note 23, at 1833–36. 
 109.  For example, as referenced in Part I, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), in stating that separate but equal education is never equal education, technically 
comported with a very broad principle of equal protection without incorporating the history 
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The interpretation-construction distinction, then, creates a 
separable Constitution, one with two faces—factual and normative—
where both are used to give meaning to the Constitution, but 
neither is truly dependent on or necessary to the other. 
Interpretation does not need construction to work or play its part, 
and construction, especially in the most controversial cases, does not 
need interpretation to work or play its part. Additionally, because 
interpretation does not have a formal role in the activity of 
construction, the distinction forces a choice in adjudication that Old 
Originalists, with their integrated understanding of interpretation 
and application, did not have to make. Either the constructionist can 
be faithful to the past—to that fixed original meaning—or the 
constructionist can be faithful to the present. But in cases where 
there is any kind of vagueness, irreducible ambiguity, or generality in 
the language of the Constitution (in other words, most cases), the 
constructionist cannot be faithful to both because that semantic 
meaning will not clearly indicate what the resolution should be. In 
those cases, the fixed past that presumably tells an interpreter what 
the Constitution meant will also cease to be useful, and the issue or 
question will then inevitably be decided by what the Constitution 
means presently (or should mean presently), rather than what it used 
to mean. 
In other words, the Constitution does have both position and 
velocity, but the interpretation-construction distinction severs one 
from the other. If an interpreter knows the semantic position of the 
past, it will not necessarily tell that interpreter how to decide the 
present; if the constructionist is creating a normative doctrine to 
resolve the constitutional issue (and thereby displace the meaning of 
the text), that normative doctrine can be created without any real-
world functional reference to the semantic past. And, because 
 
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is highly unlikely the 
hypothetical, reasonable public of 1868 would have understood their newly adopted 
Amendment to constitutionally mandate integrated education through the words “equal 
protection of the laws.” However, that construction of the Fourteenth Amendment certainly 
incorporated normative considerations pertinent in the time the case was decided. Previous to 
the decision in Brown, normative momentum for its decision had been building for many years, 
particularly through aggressive NAACP efforts to alter the educational opportunities for 
African Americans, particularly through cases such as Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), 
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), where 
enforced segregation in higher education was ruled by the Supreme Court to be unlawful. 
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determining semantic meaning and constructing a resolution are 
entirely different inquiries requiring entirely different tools and 
considerations, it would not matter if they did. The New Originalist 
Constitution, then, is a kind of quantum mechanical, inherently 
uncertain particle. 
C. Implications of a Particulate Constitution 
As discussed above, the interpretation-construction distinction 
divorces past constitutional meaning from present constitutional 
meaning. This divorce has several important implications for how the 
Constitution is conceptualized. First, it allows the Constitution to be 
a kind of blueprint bereft of normative force in its own right; the 
only normative force the New Originalist Constitution has is how 
much the present constructionist is willing to give it. Second, it 
accepts and condones untethered, free-agented constitutional 
meaning. Finally, it creates a Constitution of indeterminate, blurry 
probabilities where the unknowable future creates an equally 
unknowable Constitution. 
1. Dead recipe constitution 
First, New Originalists have characterized the Constitution as a 
recipe,110 a blueprint, an instruction manual, and a framework.111 It 
provides instruction about how our government should be 
structured. It frames certain rights that the federal government 
should not intrude upon. It lists out and identifies duties of each 
coordinating branch. It explains why it was created in the first 
place. For the Old Originalists, this characterization would have 
created an instrumental Constitution. The manual or recipe would 
have answered both the question of what the words mean and how 
(or even whether, though Old Originalism presupposes the 
 
 110.  Lawson, supra note 23. 
 111.  This is Jack Balkin’s conception. See Balkin, supra note 7; BALKIN, supra note 7. 
It makes sense, if constitutional momentum is all one is really concerned about. Whatever that 
momentum builds around the framework is what it builds, and is really, as a result, neither 
constitutionally correct nor incorrect. It simply is. However, I also think that, at its most 
absurd, it seems to me to lead to a kind of Winchester Mystery House Constitution, and 
seriously, nobody needs doors that go nowhere or stairways that abruptly end for no 
apparent reason. 
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“whether” altogether, where New Originalism does not) they 
should be applied; the Old Originalist Constitution was therefore a 
working, living Constitution.112 By contrast, the New Originalist 
Constitution is a recipe or manual with language that does have 
meaning, but that meaning may have little (or does not even need 
to have any) present-day instrumentality. The Constitution tells an 
interpreter the “what” without forcing the interpreter to decide the 
“how” or the “whether.” 
Ironically, then, the New Originalist interpretation-construction 
distinction creates the potential problem of a Dead Recipe 
Constitution113 where the words can be understood, but it is not 
clear that that meaning necessarily influences the present. Perhaps 
there is nothing inherently wrong with not automatically 
presupposing that the Constitution’s original meaning, as a 
normative matter, should be applied in every case; there are certainly 
provisions in the Constitution that do not appear to have any 
present-day meaning at all.114 However, unconcernedly allowing the 
Constitution to become a Dead Recipe ignores the fact that the 
entire impulse behind using, reading, and interpreting the 
Constitution is normative. Litigants invoke the Constitution, judges 
read and refer to the Constitution, and law students learn and study 
the Constitution precisely because there are standards and rights and 
principles and rules and guidelines articulated in it that we still think, 
as a normative matter, continue to have direct bearing on present-
day questions and issues. Interpretation is employed because of how 
we normatively regard the Constitution. 
 
 112.  Note, though, that Old Originalism also was criticized for the “dead-hand” 
problem—that it rather blindly enforced a dead-hand Constitution that perhaps has little 
functionality in present-day circumstances. Whittington, supra note 8, at 605–06, notes this as 
a criticism of Old Originalism. 
 113.  See Lawson, supra note 23. This “dead recipe” obviously plays off of his suggestion 
that the Constitution is like a recipe for government. Lawson also brings up the “dead hand” 
issue in his article, Dead Document Walking, 92 B. U. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (2012). In that 
article, he discusses Balkin’s ideas about living constitutionalism, identifying the major 
question in Balkin’s work to be: “Is the Constitution a largely completed (and therefore mostly 
dead) skyscraper or a largely unfinished (and therefore mostly living) framework?” Balkin 
argues that it is framework, not skyscraper, and through that, obviates the issue of being led by 
a kind of dead recipe. See Balkin, supra note 7; BALKIN, supra note 7. 
 114.  For example, the Migration and Importation clause probably has little meaning in 
today’s world, most especially because it is rather historically obvious that that provision dealt 
with the slave trade. 
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Further, the Constitution was debated and discussed and 
written and ultimately adopted to be normative. The Framers 
convened in that summer of 1787 to re-work the Articles of 
Confederation because its provisions (and the theoretical 
underpinnings of its provisions) were not proving to be effective in 
solving many practical issues encountered in the post-independence 
confederation.115 The Framers wrote the document (and the words 
in the document) to hopefully fix their present problems and 
provide predictive, principled structure to solve future problems. 
However the Framers may or may not have intended individual 
provisions to be applied in the future, it is at least clear that they 
intended the Constitution, as our federal government’s founding 
document, to create a government of specifically chosen and 
deliberately articulated normative elements that would do actual, 
continual, real-world work.116 
Thus, if the Constitution is a recipe for a government, it is 
undoubtedly being read, invoked, and interpreted (even by New 
Originalists) to keep “making” the government that was created in 
1787.117 The normative choice to use the Constitution has already 
been made, and that decision continues to be made every time it is 
invoked, studied, interpreted, and even used to justify a particular 
result through construction. The words were written to effectuate 
ends (or in other words, to be instrumental) by embodying 
particular principles (by being normative). This suggests that the 
Constitution’s semantic meaning does, as a practical matter, 
incorporate fundamental normative meaning and should have 
 
 115.  Our Constitution forbids states from forming treaties with foreign nations and 
declares treaties to be supreme law, for example, precisely because of problems created by the 
Confederation’s inability to enforce post-Revolutionary War treaties. 
 116.  The text of the Preamble seems to establish this: “We the People of the United 
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 117.  Perhaps this is a circular argument—we read recipes for fried chicken because we 
choose to make fried chicken and we make fried chicken by reading the recipe, much like we 
make this particular government by reading its recipe and this recipe was written to make this 
particular government. But that is also kind of the point. It is too difficult, too problematic, to 
separate the making from the choice, and the choice from the making, especially in a case 
where both are necessary to produce, as it were, the fried chicken for dinner in an hour, or 
tomorrow, or next week, or next year. 
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normative force, just like any constructed meaning will have 
normative force. Willingly divorcing the semantic force118 from 
application creates a dead recipe of known facts that are not 
normatively necessary.119 In place of this dead recipe, what is left—
what becomes normatively necessary—are the value choices of the 
adjudicating judiciary. However accurate or appealing this may be in 
theory this is a result that does not reflect the reality—that by 
continuing to actively use the Constitution, the words are still 
expected to live rather than die a factual death. 
2. Free-agented constitution 
Second, by asserting the distinction between interpretation and 
construction, the New Originalists have untethered its present 
meaning from its past meaning, and it is thereby unclear what the 
Constitution will mean for (or how it will be used in) the present or 
the future.120 The Old Originalist insistence on tethering past 
meaning to present circumstances limited the range of potential 
present (and future) meanings to those connected to historical 
intent. While reasonable interpreters could differ regarding the 
evidence bearing upon the intent or regarding which evidentially-
supported intent seemed to be the most accurate (in cases where 
more than one intent was apparent from available historical 
evidence), at least there was a single and consistent frame of 
reference imposed upon present-day constitutional application.121 
Without this kind of tethering, the range of potential present and 
future meanings expands, and it seemingly expands according to 
 
 118.  If the preceding discussion did not make this clear, I’m arguing that yes, the 
semantic meaning of the constitution does have normative force. The Framers, whatever else 
they were doing in that 1787 summer, weren’t penning pretty words simply because the words 
themselves were pretty. 
 119.  Whatever else may be said about Old Originalists, being ruled by a so-called “dead 
hand” may actually be better than turning the Constitution into a dead recipe. 
 120.  The Constitution’s meaning can be determined by free-agent judges (which is a 
state of being that our government structure rather prefers: to have judges that are 
theoretically separated from politics) who may perceive values, norms, and exigencies 
differently from each other, which is pretty much what Old Originalism originally attempted 
to prevent. 
 121.  As discussed earlier, this was one of Justice Antonin Scalia’s main points in 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra, note 12. See supra Part I. 
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however broadly or restrictively one (such as a free-agent-esque 
judge) is willing to read the language of the Constitution. 
Interestingly, not every New Originalist expresses the same level 
of comfort with the size of this potential range. For example, 
Professor Gary Lawson suggests that the uncertainties arising from 
interpretation can be resolved in adjudication by selecting the 
“standard of proof for claims about constitutional meaning.”122 He 
suggests that, for example, someone arguing that a particular action 
is constitutional must prove it according to an assigned burden of 
proof—beyond a reasonable doubt, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, or otherwise.123 He argues that this shrinks the potential 
size of the area available for constitutional construction by assigning 
the resolution of uncertainties to a specific party, rather than to 
potential normative constructions by the adjudicator. Alternatively, 
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport argue that 
construction will become unnecessary altogether if the Constitution 
is “interpreted using the interpretive methods that the constitutional 
enactors would have deemed applicable to it.”124 They suggest that 
there is no support for construction at all at the Framing, and that 
any ambiguity or vagueness would have been “resolved by 
considering evidence of history, structure, purpose, and intent.”125 
Similarly, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen argues that the 
Constitution itself prescribes its own rules for interpretation, and, as 
 
 122.  Lawson, Dead Document Walking, supra note 113, at 1235 (emphasis omitted). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 
(2009). McGinnis and Rappaport cannot fairly be called “New Originalists” as described in 
this article, because they do not find evidentiary support that constitutional construction was a 
method the Framers used to interpret a constitutional document. However, neither can they 
fairly be called Old Originalists, either, because they do not advocate simply looking for 
Framer intent. Rather, they argue that constitutional interpretation should be governed by 
“interpretive rules in place when the Constitution was enacted.” Id. at 752. Because they assert 
that original methods originalism does not “guarantee[] that [the original interpretative rules] 
were originalist,” and that those original interpretative rules may have included looking for 
“original meaning” as well as “original intent,” I have included them here as another data 
point in the broad spectrum of how to deal with the space between interpretation and 
construction. Id. They may reject constitutional construction, but they do so only by replacing 
it with another theory (their original methods theory) that purports to deal with the questions 
construction attempts to answer. Id. at 751–53. In effect, they therefore appear to be 
theorizing about how to best deal with and conceptualize construction. 
 125.  Id. at 752. 
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embodied in the Constitution, when the text itself stands for a 
principle, “popular republican self-government” should decide how 
that principle should be interpreted, which effectively shrinks the 
choices for resolution.126 Professor Keith Whittington argues that 
construction is merely supplementary to interpretation, and that 
even if construction is necessary to apply the semantic meaning, 
those constructions should not presumptively be made by the 
judiciary.127 He argues that while judicial constructions are 
sometimes appropriate, at other times they are “more avoidable” in 
favor of political branch resolution,128 and that if there is a range of 
normative choices, those normative choices should at least be 
constrained by choices of elected, democratic majorities.129 Finally, 
Professor Jack Balkin argues that the Constitution is merely a 
framework, and that construction is required precisely because it 
does not actually give detailed normative advice about how to decide 
cases.130 Instead, he argues that the Constitution itself explains how 
constitutional change is to occur between political branches and the 
courts. For Balkin, construction is constitutionally mandated, and 
that potential range of constructive choices is entirely determined by 
the range of present-day circumstances, political pressures, and 
cultural changes.131 
Importantly, each of the above solutions presupposes that the 
range of potential choice does exist, and each appears to mitigate 
(or, perhaps for Balkin, happily accept) the consequences of a 
semantic past that, for many cases, is effectively stuck in the past, 
thereby leaving open a thoroughfare-like constructive future. The 
variety in these solutions does, by itself, seem to indicate how open, 
innovative, different, and new present and future constitutional 
 
 126.  Paulsen, supra note 24, at 881. 
 127.  Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 128 (2011). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 129 (“So long as judges are acting as faithful agents to provisionally maintain 
constitutional understandings widely shared by other political actors, then their role in 
articulating constitutional constructions may not be objectionable. As they become innovators 
on behalf of constitutional understandings that are not widely shared by other political actors, 
then the legitimacy of courts engaging in constitutional construction would seem to 
be limited.”). 
 130.  Balkin, supra note 7, at 550. 
 131.  Id. 
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meaning can be without a connected past. The more possibilities 
for dealing with the range of potential constructions and 
resolutions, the more potential constructions and resolutions there 
seemingly must be. Therefore, instead of trying to tether, New 
Originalists must instead try to corral, and however they choose to 
corral will ultimately be a product of their own normative, free-
agent constructions. 
3. Blurry constitution 
Finally, whatever the range-size of potential outcomes, the 
interpretation-construction distinction also changes the quality of 
those possible outcomes. Because the distinction does not require 
past meaning to play an active role in determining present potential 
outcomes, the various present-day quantum “waves” pressed 
through the Constitution will only ever present a “smeared”132 and 
blurry range of probable outcomes, rather than actual, certain, 
determinate possibilities. 
Recall that in quantum mechanics, the higher the energy in the 
quantum used to locate the particle, the more the particle’s speed 
will be displaced (and therefore the more unknowable the velocity 
will be). Similarly, the more vague, abstract, or principle-like the 
constitutional text at issue, the more inherently unknowable the 
potential outcomes issuing from that text will be. Passing a present-
day “wave” through that text will create a resultant range that will be 
blurrier and contain a larger number of probable, potential outcomes 
than a wave passed through a rule-like provision. The final 
constructed outcome in such a blurry case will be no more “correct” 
in a constitutional sense than any of the other probable outcomes, 
and the outcome will ultimately be driven by whatever normative 
forces the adjudicator chooses to recognize and apply to the text and 
the case at hand. This is particularly so because if the fixed meaning 
of the past does not meaningfully (or even perceptibly) interact in 
the construction of a particular provision, that blurry range of 
probable choices will change with every new case to be resolved 
under that provision, because the present circumstances, in every 
case, will be different. The legal meaning, particularly of those vague 
 
 132.  HAWKING, supra note 2, at 58. 
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and abstract provisions, will be continually dependent on those 
changing present circumstances. The “blur” will therefore not focus 
or clear up with repeated adjudication of the same provision; every 
case will present a qualitatively different “blur” from the “blur” that 
may have been used to finally decide any prior case. 
Additionally, the lack of clarity caused by the “blur” will be 
exacerbated by being, as referenced previously, adjudicator-
dependent. A New Originalist judge, unlike an Old Originalist 
judge, will not be restrained by a fixed past, particularly when 
confronted with having to apply broad constitutional principles. 
Instead, such a judge may effectively apply his/her own views 
about construction and the normative considerations driving it.133 
As discussed above, even New Originalist scholars are not all in 
agreement about what to do with the construction zone. If those 
claiming to identify with the theory cannot agree on how to deal 
with the constructive step, it cannot be expected that judges 
adjudicating actual cases will agree on the breadth of that range of 
probabilities or how to ultimately deal with those probable 
outcomes either. 
The result of this constitutional “blur” will be that unless a case’s 
facts and circumstances and exigencies and values and policy choices 
and year and political climate and judge are exactly the same, it is 
unlikely that the outcomes related to a constitutional provision will 
be particularly predictive (as is the big quandary in quantum 
mechanics). The only point that will ever be constitutionally 
“known” will be that one fixed, isolated, thinly useful point of a 
provision’s adoption; beyond that there will be shifting probabilities, 
blurs, and smears that are dependent upon a continuously shifting 
present. Thus, we cannot “see” or effectively use constitutional 
position and constitutional velocity at once, so we cannot truly 
“know” the present or the future constitutional particle either. The 
result of the New Originalist interpretation-construction distinction 
 
 133.  Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 32, at 472–73 
(“Constitutional construction is not driven by facts in the same way. Rather, construction is 
essentially driven by normative concerns. . . . The abstract fact that construction is essentially 
normative does not entail any particular account of the norms that ought to govern the 
practice of construction. . . . [T]he important point is that there are several possible approaches 
to the construction zone that are consistent with the core commitments of originalism to 
fixation and constraint.”). 
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is therefore that we may know what the Constitution meant once 
upon a time, but we do not now know, and cannot further know, 
what it actually means. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In 1926, with the formulation of the Uncertainty Principle, 
Marquis de Laplace’s determinate universe was forever obliterated, 
and we will likely never get it back. Since that time, we have had to 
adjust to living in a fundamentally uncertain universe where the 
present cannot be precisely known and the future cannot be 
precisely predicted. 
In such a universe, it is possible that the New Originalists are 
right—that there is a functional and qualitative difference between 
the activities of interpretation and construction, and that one is not 
determinate of the other. However, this distinction makes 
uncertainty inherent in the Constitution by treating it like a particle 
with two separable characteristics—a locative, fixed past, and a 
present, continuously displaced normative velocity. Constitutional 
outcomes are thus ultimately expressed as probabilities rather than 
actualities. The cost of living in such a constitutional universe is that 
the present and future meaning of the Constitution is unknowable. 
Perhaps this is how it must be. 
But it does make one crave a little Laplace. 
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